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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3867
___________
DORIS J. HARMAN; JAMES D. HARMAN;
CITIZENS WATER COMPANY OF SPRING GLEN,
Appellants
v.
PAUL J. DATTE; HEGINS HUBLEY AUTHORITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 09-cv-02398)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 13, 2011
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 17, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Doris and James Harman, proceeding pro se, appeal an order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting motions to dismiss their

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.1
In their complaint, the Harmans alleged that that the Hegins Hubley Authority, a
public water company, and its attorney, Paul Datte, disconnected the main water line
between Citizens Water Company and the village of Spring Glen, Pennsylvania,
requiring the Harmans to supply water from an alternate source to a property they owned
and rented to two families. The Harmans claimed the Authority and Datte breached a
verbal agreement not to cut Citizen Water Company’s lines and stated that the lack of
water supply resulted in a loss of rental income and other expenses.
The Harmans further alleged that the Authority and Datte filed a lien against their
property in connection with unpaid water and sewer bills. The Harmans averred that they
did not use any water and that the lien resulted in their property being sold at a sheriff’s
sale. The Harmans further alleged that the Authority and Datte discriminated against
them because, while others also received “bogus bills,” only their property was sold at a
sheriff’s sale. Finally, the Harmans averred that the Authority and Datte have used the
United States mail to defraud them out of the right to defend themselves in a legal action
by sending documents to a false address.

1

Mr. Harman also filed an appeal on behalf of Citizens Water Company. Mr.
Harman, however, is not an attorney and may not represent this entity. Simbraw, Inc. v.
United States, 367 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam). The Court previously directed
that an attorney enter an appearance on behalf of Citizens Water Company or the appeal
would be dismissed as to this party. As no attorney has entered an appearance, Citizens
Water Company is dismissed as a party to this appeal.
2

Although their legal claims are not entirely clear, the Harmans cited several
statutes in their complaint, including 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1968. They also mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment. As relief, the Harmans sought
$2,000,000 plus punitive damages.
The Authority and Datte filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the
District Court grant the motions. The Magistrate Judge explained that, to the extent
Harman sought mandamus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the District Court lacks
authority to issue such relief against the defendants, who are not United States employees
or officials. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that Harman has no private right of
action for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and, to the extent Harman claimed a
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), only the
Attorney General can pursue the remedies set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1968. The Magistrate
Judge further found that the Harmans had not properly pleaded a cause of action under
any other provision of RICO. The Magistrate Judge also concluded that the Harmans
failed to state an equal protection claim, a breach of contract claim, a due process claim
based on the alleged denial of water, or a claim based on the alleged fraudulent lien.
The Harmans filed objections to the report, which did not contest the Magistrate
Judge’s legal conclusions but raised procedural and discovery issues. The District Court
concluded that the objections lacked merit. The District Court also reviewed the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendations for clear error and adopted, as modified, the
3

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to grant the motions to dismiss. This
appeal followed.2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review of the
order granting the motions to dismiss is plenary. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). We review discovery matters for
abuse of discretion. Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999).3
The Harmans argue on appeal that the District Court erred by failing to issue a
writ of mandamus “at least ordering an investigation into the proven violations[.]”
Appellant’s Br. At 6. We disagree. The District Court properly concluded that such a
remedy was not available because, to the extent they sought mandamus relief in their
complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 only affords a remedy against persons who are employees or
officers of the United States and neither of the defendants fall in these categories.
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1980).
The Harmans further argue that the District Court failed to entertain their amended
complaint, which added Erik Helbing as a defendant. The District Court explained that

2

The District Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations to
dismiss the Harmans’ claims but concluded that their equal protection claim should be
dismissed on different grounds than those advanced by the Magistrate Judge. The
Harmans do not pursue this claim on appeal. The District Court also declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the Harmans’ breach of contract claim. This claim is addressed below.
3

To the extent plain error review applies to arguments on appeal that are not raised
in objections to a Magistrate Judge’s report, we decline to apply such review here, where
it does not appear the Harmans were warned that a failure to object would result in a
forfeiture of their rights. See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2007).
4

the Magistrate Judge properly treated the Harmans’ filing as a motion to file an amended
complaint naming Helbing as defendant because the time to amend their complaint as a
matter of course had expired. The District Court also agreed with the Magistrate Judge
that allowing the Harmans to amend their complaint would be futile because they had
made no specific allegations against Helbing. The Harmans have not shown that the
District Court erred in treating their filing as a motion to amend their complaint or in
denying the motion.4
The Harmans also contend that they were denied the ability to conduct discovery
in District Court and prove their claims. As recognized by the District Court, the
Magistrate Judge stayed discovery pending review of the motions to dismiss the
complaint, which are decided on the pleadings. We find no abuse of discretion in this
regard.
The Harmans further assert that the Authority breached a verbal contract in
terminating the water supply. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a state law breach of contract claim, having dismissed the Harmans’
remaining claims. The District Court did not err and properly dismissed this claim
without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Finally, to the extent the Harmans assert in their brief that they should be able to

4

In his brief in opposition to Datte’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Harman stated that
Helbing purchased his property at the sheriff’s sale. Although the Harmans assert a
conspiracy existed between Datte and Helbing, they have not stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
5

pursue this appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, they are
mistaken. An appeal from a decision of the district court shall be taken to the court of
appeals for the circuit embracing the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1294. The Harmans have not
shown that their appeal falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, as set forth by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.5

5

Appellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal for failure to file a brief is denied as

moot.
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